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Abstract
This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to
investigate the causal effect of public recognition on employee performance. We
hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random
sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours
of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially,
and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers.
Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this
performance increase. This result is consistent with workers having a preference for
conformity.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a surge in popular business books on the importance of recognition
for employee motivation. A prominent example is the book by Nelson (2005) entitled
1001 Ways to Reward Employees. He starts his book by stating that a number of surveys
“confirm what almost every employee already knows: that recognition for a job well done
is the top motivator of employee performance.”1 Other questionnaire studies reveal similar
views among employees (Kovach, 1995; Wiley, 1997) and managers (Holton et al., 2009).
The vast amount of practitioner literature on employee recognition is supported by
a body of academic research in organizational and personnel psychology. Stajkovic and
Luthans (2003) give an overview of field-experimental studies and report strong positive
effects of recognition on employees’ performance in a variety of workplace contexts.
More recently, Grant and Gino (2010) experimentally study how a manager’s verbal
expression of gratitude affects employees’ effort and find strong positive effects.2
While the existing literature provides a fairly consistent picture that recognition
improves employee performance, much less is known about how exclusive or inclusive
recognition should be. Should all employees receive recognition? Or is more
differentiation desirable? In particular, does providing recognition to all workers
demoralize the top-performers, thus creating a culture of mediocrity? Or does reserving
praise for the best performers come at the cost of discouraging the others?
In this paper we take up these questions by conducting a large-scale field experiment
in a controlled working environment. Over the course of November 2010 to May
2011, we hired 363 people (mainly students) for a three-hour data-entry job.3 We
created a work environment where eight workers shared the same room, but worked
individually. Workers were paid a flat wage of 25 euro and were not aware that they
were taking part in an experiment. In a random sample of work groups, workers received
1 He continues with “yet most managers do not understand or use the potential power of recognition
and rewards [...] while money is important to employees, research shows that what motivates them really
to perform [...] is the thoughtful, personal kind of recognition that signifies true appreciation for a job well
done.”
2 Effects of praise and recognition have also been studied in other contexts. Fisher and Ackerman
(1998) investigate the effect of recognition on parents’ willingness to volunteer for their kids’ soccer
club. An early lab experiment is Deci and Ryan (1971) showing that provision of praise increases
students’ willingness to work on a puzzle. Cameron and Pierce (1994) provide a survey of the subsequent
lab-experimental literature. Finally, some studies in management provide correlational evidence, e.g.,
Rhoades and Eisenberger (2002), Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005), and Wagner and Harter (2006).
3Short-term data-entry jobs like ours have been frequently employed in recent field experiments studying
the impact of rewards on performance, because they allow for a precise measurement of performance and
provide for a high degree of control (see among others Gneezy and List, 2006, Hennig-Schmitt et al., 2010,
Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011, and Kube et al., 2012, forthcoming).
1
public recognition after two hours of work. Following Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011),
recognition consisted of a thank-you card, personally signed by the head of the research
institute and handed out by a research assistant.4 Thus, the provision of recognition did
not involve any material reward but clearly showed the management’s appreciation for
workers’ effort. From the way the thank-you card was presented, workers could deduce
that no further formal recognition would be provided in the remainder of the working
period. A defining feature of the type of recognition that we have in mind is that it is
not expected and hence comes as a surprise to employees.5 Therefore, and in contrast to
Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011), the possible provision of recognition was not announced
at the start of the three-hour working period.
To address the research questions posed above, we vary the scarcity of recognition
between different treatments. In one treatment, all workers in a group receive the
thank-you card. In the other treatments, the thank-you card is given only to the best
performer or to the best three performers of a group of eight. When handing out
the thank-you cards in these latter treatments, it is mentioned that their assignment is
determined by performance during the first two working hours. Further, we make clear
that the management recognizes the work input from all workers, but can only recognize
a subset of the employees explicitly due to constraints. This resembles that, in practice,
managers are often constrained in the number of people they can praise. Lastly, we take
care that perceived monitoring is constant across all treatments.
Our focus is on how the provision of recognition affects subsequent performance
of workers, how this depends on the scarcity of recognition, and how the response of
recipients differs from that of non-recipients. We argue that three behavioral mechanisms
may be operational: conditional altruism, reciprocity, and conformity preferences of
employees. As we shall see, our results are consistent with a combination of conformity
and reciprocity preferences.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we draw on existing behavioral
theories to develop hypotheses on the effects of different forms of recognition. Next, we
describe the experimental setup in Section 3. Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy and
presents the results of our experiment. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
4 The use of such thank-you cards is not uncommon in business. Postcards
producer Hallmark devotes a separate website to employee thank-you cards, see
http://hallmark.businessgreetings.com/employeerecognitioncards-employeethankyoucards-3-0.
5 This is often true in practice, even in organizations with a culture for praise. While recognition in
general might be expected in such organizations, the particular situation, timing, and kind of recognition
remain a surprise.
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2 Theory
Why might the unannounced provision of recognition in the form of a thank-you card
affect subsequent performance of workers? And does it matter whether all workers or
only the best performing workers in a group receive a thank-you card? We can think
of three plausible behavioral mechanisms through which provision of public recognition
may affect subsequent performance.
2.1 Reciprocity of employees
First, workers may consider the thank-you card as a gift from the employer and feel
inclined to reciprocate. A natural way to reciprocate is to increase effort in the remainder
of the session. According to Blau (1964), the reason that gifts are reciprocated is that
people "are interested in maintaining a balance between inputs and outputs and staying
out of debt in their social transactions" (p. 26). Following the seminal paper by Akerlof
(1982) and the influential experimental work by Fehr et al. (1993), reciprocity has become
a firmly established concept in economics. Most studies in economics have focused on
wages as the employer’s means of exchange in reciprocal relationships with workers.
An exception is Kube et al. (2012), who show that non-pecuniary gifts are particularly
powerful in triggering subsequent work effort. Other social sciences have also considered
socio-emotional gifts that address “social and esteem needs (and are often symbolic and
particularistic)”(Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005, p. 881). The thank-you card, which is
central to our treatments, clearly falls into this latter category.
To formalize this idea in the simplest possible way, suppose that workers have the
following utility function (as in Dur et al., 2010):
u = w + βe+ γae− 1
2
e2,
where w is the base salary, e represents the worker’s effort, a the amount or value
of recognition received from the employer, γ indicates the importance of reciprocal
feelings, β captures other intrinsic motives to exert effort, and the last term of the
equation represents the worker’s costs of effort. Clearly, a worker’s optimal effort is
increasing in the amount of recognition received (maximization of u with respect to e
gives e∗ = β + γa). Workers who do not receive a thank-you card do not respond to
the intervention. Thus, in treatments where only a subset of workers receives a thank-you
card, we only expect recipients to respond. Moreover, scarcity may increase the perceived
value of the card (represented by a in the model), implying a stronger response of
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recipients when the number of recipients decreases.
2.2 Conditional altruism of employees
A second reason for why the provision of a thank-you card may affect subsequent effort
is that the card provides a signal to the workers about the employer’s kindness or his
care for the workers. The key assumption is that workers are conditionally altruistic, that
is, they care more for an employer who cares for them. As a result, workers respond
with increased effort when they perceive the thank-you card as a credible signal of the
employer’s kindness (see Levine, 1998, and more recently Dur, 2009, and Non, 2012).
This tendency to contribute to the welfare of a kind person can be seen as a form of
reciprocity, but it has implications that are different from those of the simple reciprocity
model considered above, particularly for the response of non-recipients.6 The following
game-theoretic model illustrates the basic mechanism.
Consider a group of n workers who work for an employer whose altruism towards
them is private information. It is common knowledge, however, that the employer’s
altruism, denoted αj , is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval
0 to 1. The utility of worker i is described by
ui = wi + βei + γαj
n∑
i=1
(ei − wi)− 1
2
e2i ,
where we use the same notation as above. The term γαj
∑n
i=1(ei − wi) captures the idea
that workers care more about the profits of the employer (
∑n
i=1(ei −wi)) if the employer
is more altruistic towards them. As αj is unobservable, workers form beliefs over αj ,
denoted by α̂j . We assume that profits are simply the sum of all workers’ effort minus
wage costs. The employer’s payoff yj is:
yj =
n∑
i=1
(ei − wi) + αj
n∑
i=1
ui − c (αj) ,
where the second term captures his altruistic utility. The employer can signal his type
by creating thank-you cards, where c (αj) captures the costs (of effort, time, and money)
involved in creating a given number of cards. When no cards are created, c (αj) = 0 for
any αj . In the spirit of Camerer (1988), Prendergast and Stole (2001), and Ellingsen and
Johannesson (2011), we assume that the costs of creating thank-you cards decrease in the
6 Some authors have stressed the importance of good intentions for reciprocity. The approach taken by
Levine (1998) that we adopt here can be seen as a simple way to model intentions. Models that formalize
intentions yield similar predictions, e.g., Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2010).
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employer’s altruism, i.e., c′(αj) < 0.7 Further, to keep the model as simple as possible,
assume that there are two working periods of equal length and no time discounting. Costs
associated with the cards are incurred before the second working period starts. The cards
are handed out in between the two working periods.
Applying backward induction, it is easily verified that workers’ effort increases in
their beliefs about the employer’s altruism α̂j: the optimal effort choice is e∗ = β + γα̂j .
The optimal effort choice in the first working period reflects the prior belief α̂j = 12 . At
the start of the second period, the employer hands out cards or not, and workers update
their beliefs using Bayes’ rule. As the cards are handed out publicly, both recipients and
non-recipients receive the same information, and therefore hold the same beliefs about
the employer’s type. Thus, on the basis of the signaling model, we expect no difference
in the response to the cards between recipients and non-recipients.
Since workers’ effort and utility increase in workers’ beliefs α̂j , all employer types
would like to be perceived as altruistic as possible. However, this incentive is stronger
for more altruistic employer types, as they genuinely care about the workers’ utility.
Moreover, as c′(αj) < 0, providing recognition is less costly for more altruistic types.
They can therefore distinguish themselves from less altruistic types by sending a signal
that is too costly for less altruistic types to imitate. Thus, handing out thank-you cards
provides a signal about the employer’s altruism when the costs of providing the cards
exceed their benefits for types below some threshold level of altruism α∗, while handing
out cards is profitable for types above the threshold. The threshold level of altruism α∗
is formally derived in Appendix A. An employer who hands out cards is believed to be a
type from the interval α∗ to 1, while an employer who abstains from doing so is believed
to be a type from the interval 0 to α∗. Equilibrium effort in working period 2 with and
without cards are β + γ 1+α
∗
2
and β + γ α
∗
2
, respectively. On the basis of signaling theory,
we thus expect a positive effort response to provision of recognition for recipients and
non-recipients alike.
An increase in the costs of providing cards strengthens the workers’ response to the
cards. The reason is that higher costs imply that fewer employer types find it attractive
to signal, only the most altruistic types do so. Hence, assuming that costs increase in
the number of cards, the signal is the stronger the more cards are provided. The effort
response therefore differs between treatments, with stronger responses if more cards are
distributed.8 Note that this is opposite to the prediction of the simple reciprocity model in
7 This assumption is not essential for the results, see Appendix A.
8 Other signaling models are closely related, for instance the model of Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2008). The key idea in their model is that workers care more about social esteem when the principal
shows that he is worth impressing. Alternatively, the thank-you card may affect workers’ beliefs about how
important their effort is to the employer or how important the task is (task significance). These theories
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the previous subsection.
2.3 Conformity preferences of employees
Third and last, in the treatments where only the best-performing workers receive a
thank-you card, preferences for conformity may give rise to behavioral responses.
Recipients in these treatments learn that their performance belongs to the top within
their group. Likewise, non-recipients learn that they belong to the lower end of the
performance distribution. If workers have a preference for conformity (for example, if
they want to behave like others or to adhere to a group norm as in Bernheim, 1994, Sliwka,
2007, Fischer and Huddart, 2008, and Chen et al., 2010), this coarse rank information
should increase effort of non-recipients and decrease effort of recipients. The effect on
non-recipients should be less pronounced when the thank-you card is provided to fewer
workers, as less information is provided about one’s standing. Thus, we expect smaller
effects for non-recipients in the treatment where only a single thank-you-card is provided
to the best performer as compared to the treatment where the three best-performing
workers receive a thank-you card. Conversely, recipients of the card should respond
more strongly when fewer thank-you cards are distributed, as this provides a stronger
signal of exceptionally high performance by the recipients. Lastly, on the basis of
conformity preferences alone, we do not expect any treatment effects when all workers
are provided with a thank-you card, since nothing is revealed about relative performance
in this treatment.9
To illustrate this mechanism, consider 8 workers who work for two periods. In both
periods, workers choose an effort level e. Their utility function is described by
u = ye− 1
2
e2.
Workers condition their effort choice on what they consider as the group norm, denoted
yield similar predictions.
9 The effect of relative performance feedback on performance has recently been studied in a variety
of contexts, ranging from student test scores (Bandiera et al., 2009; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010; Tran and
Zeckhauser, 2012), contributions to an online community (Chen et al., 2010), real-effort in the lab (Charness
et al., 2012; Freeman and Gelber, 2010; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012), to workers’ performance in a real
working environment (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Delfgaauw et al., forthcoming; Blanes i Vidal and Nossol,
2011; Barankay, 2011a,b). With the noteworthy exception of Barankay (2011a,b), all of these papers find
that relative performance feedback has on average a positive effect on performance. A subset of these papers
also looks at where in the performance distribution people are most responsive to feedback; results tend to
be mixed in this respect. A distinguishing feature of our study is that we look at ex post effects of rank
revelation that is not announced ex ante and in the absence of further rank concerns (as ranks will not be
disclosed again). Most of the empirical papers as well as the theoretical literature center around the effect
of rank revelation in ongoing tournaments.
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y. The level of y cannot be observed, but it is common knowledge that y is drawn from
a uniform distribution over the interval 0 to 1. At the start of the first period, workers
receive a private signal s1 about y. This signal can be either high (s1 = H) or low
(s1 = L). The probability that the signal is high increases in y . In particular, we
assume that pr (s1 = H | y) = y and pr (s1 = L | y) = 1 − y. After the first period,
the three best-performing workers unexpectedly receive recognition (we deal with the
case of recognition for the best employee below). When workers have identical output,
a random draw decides. Receiving and not-receiving recognition is denoted by s2 = R
and s2 = N , respectively. This information gives workers the possibility to update their
beliefs about y, denoted ŷ.10
First, we analyze the effort choice in the first period. Straightforward maximization
of expected utility reveals that optimal effort equates the expectation of y, that is e∗ = ŷ.
The worker’s expectation depends on the signal received, as follows:
E (y | s1 = H) =
∫
pr (s1 = H | y) .ydy∫
pr (s1 = H | y) dy =
∫
y2dy∫
ydy
,
yielding E (y | s1 = H) = 2/3, while similar calculations show that E (y | s1 = L) =
1/3. Thus, workers who received a high signal work harder than those who received a
low signal and have a higher probability of receiving recognition at the start of the second
period as a result.
At the start of the second period, additional information becomes available via the
public distribution of recognition to the best performers. After recognition is provided,
workers may have four possible beliefs, depending on the private signal received in the
first period and whether the worker received recognition or not. First, we investigate the
response of a recipient of recognition who received a high signal in the first round. His
posterior belief about y is equal to
E (y | s1 = H, s2 = R) =
∫
pr (s1 = H ∩ s2 = R | y) .ydy∫
pr (s1 = H ∩ s2 = R | y) .dy ,
which is equal to 25
42
, and, hence, less than the first-period belief 2/3. So, the worker
reduces effort upon receiving recognition, as it increases the likelihood that many other
workers had a low signal, and hence y < 2/3. Similar calculations show that receiving
recognition also has a negative effect on a recipient who initially received a low signal:
E (y | s1 = L, s2 = R) = 16 < 1/3. In fact, the reduction in effort is substantial
as receiving recognition despite low first-period effort reveals that there are at least 5
10Alternative interpretations of y are task significance and whether the employer is kind and/or worth
impressing as in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007, 2008).
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co-workers with a low signal. Thus, such a recipient tends to reduce effort. Third,
the effort of a non-recipient who received a high signal in the first round is given by
E (y | s1 = H, s2 = N) = 2330 , which is higher than 2/3. This means that he updates his
belief positively: he learns that there are at least three co-workers who also received the
high signal, and that, hence, y is probably high. Finally, the response of a non-recipient
who received a low signal in the first round is described by E (y | s1 = L, s2 = N) = 1130 ,
implying a small positive update. To conclude, the conformity model predicts that
recipients exert less effort while non-recipients exert more effort than in the first period.
It is straightforward to repeat the analysis for the case of recognition to the best employee
only. Qualitatively, the results are the same, but stronger for the recipient and weaker for
the non-recipients of recognition.
Table 1 summarizes our theoretical predictions.
3 Design and Implementation
3.1 Background
To estimate the causal effect of recognition on employee performance, we conducted
a natural field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004).11 This means that we observed
participants in a controlled work environment and that subjects were not aware of the
fact that they were part of an experiment. On behalf of a German research institute –
the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) – we hired students for a one-time
data-entry job between November 2010 and May 2011. At the time, the institute had just
received several hundreds of surveys that could not be processed automatically, which
made manual entry into a database necessary. For this job, we hired students from
different universities in and around Mannheim via student job centers, flyers, and notes
on bulletin boards. The announcement informed subjects that the research center needed
short-term student helpers for a three-hour data-entry job and that subjects would receive
a fixed wage of 25 euro.12 Students could sign up for the job online and were subsequently
contacted by phone to arrange date and time of their assignment. We minimized career
concerns by informing participants that the job was one-time, that a second participation
11 In addition to the treatments reported in this paper, we conducted four additional treatments
investigating other ways of providing recognition in the same setup. Results from these treatments are
reported in Bradler and Neckermann (2013) and Bradler et al. (2013). All regressions reported below
include observations from and dummies for these treatments to obtain more accurate estimates for the
coefficients of the control variables.
12 The fixed wage corresponds to a typical hourly wage of students for this kind of short-term job.
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was not possible for tax reasons,13 and that the research team was not looking for
permanently employed research assistants at the moment. We invited subjects in groups
of eight. Sessions took place at two different locations and three different times of the
day (morning, noon, and afternoon).14 Following Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011), we
implemented recognition by handing out thank-you cards (see Figure 1) to participants. In
contrast to Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011), these thank-you cards were not announced
at the start of the working period. Instead, they were unexpectedly provided after two
hours of work to either all or a subset of participants in the work session depending on the
treatment. After this interruption, participants worked for another hour.
3.2 Implementation
Upon arrival, subjects chose a workstation and were assigned a login code for the data
entry surface. The workspaces were arranged in a U-shape with sufficient space between
individuals to ensure that subjects felt unobserved. After all formalities (privacy policy,
wage agreement) were taken care of, the fixed wage of 25 euro was paid in advance to
stress that payment was independent of work performance. Subsequently, the participants
received a short introduction to their employer (ZEW) and to the project that the surveys
stemmed from. The surveys were part of an evaluation project in the educational context
and involved responses from several hundreds of students to questions about their school
and career preferences. Additionally, a short briefing was given on how to file the answers
from the questionnaires into the database. As the data were filed via a web interface,
access to the internet was visible and possible at any time. The interface was set up as an
online version of the paper surveys that the participants had in front of them. Most survey
questions were multiple choice, only a few questions required entering information from
free text fields. To minimize productivity spillovers between participants, questionnaires
were stacked in a high, non-transparent box placed in front of each participant, with an
identical box next to it to deposit the completed ones.
After the instructions were given, the research assistant left the room. She informed
participants that she was working outside and was available for queries at any time,
and that subjects could take breaks whenever necessary. These measures (individual
breaks, payment in advance, internet access, and absence of supervisor) were taken
13 In case of a second participation, participants would exceed the threshold of earnings beyond which
tax-based information needs to be collected. This would cause substantial administrative effort for fiscal
reporting and was, hence, not desired by the research institute.
14 The field experiment was carried out at the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in
Mannheim and the Ruprecht-Karls University of Heidelberg. In the regressions we control for time-of-day
as well as for day-of-week and location effects, but dropping these controls does not affect the results. All
sessions were conducted by the same research assistant.
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to give participants substantial leeway in the amount of time they spend on filling the
database. Furthermore, a collective break was avoided to minimize possible group effects
and communication between participants.15 When participants entered the room at the
beginning, they freely chose a workstation. Each work station was provided with an
individual login and a set of questionnaires. The research assistant publicly made note
about which workstation was used by whom. Thus, subjects were aware of the fact
that login codes of a workstation could be linked to their person, which holds perceived
monitoring constant across treatments.
Eight subjects were assigned to each working session. However, since some subjects
did not show up, the average number of participants per session was 7.21 (s.d. = 0.87).
The timeline was as follows: the formalities and introduction lasted for about 18 minutes
on average. Then, participants worked on the task for roughly 102 minutes. We refer
to this phase as working period 1.16 Subsequent to working period 1 (i.e., two hours
after participants’ official start of work), the research assistant entered the room and
told subjects that the IT-department of the institute had just confirmed that the data
were transmitted correctly from each computer to the central data base.17 Depending
on the treatment, she did or did not provide recognition by handing out thank-you cards,
following a standard procedure described in the next subsection. Subsequently, subjects
worked for approximately one additional hour – which we refer to as working period 2.18
Working period 1 was longer than working period 2 to allow for variation in the length
of the introductory period and to let learning effects smooth out which we believed to be
largest at the beginning of working period 1. After the second working period, feedback
forms were handed out, which asked for improvement suggestions and comments on how
we handled the short-term employment. These forms allowed us to gather information on
field of study.
15 Because the assistant was sitting outside, we have no perfect monitoring of the amount of
communication in the room. However, the research assistant was sitting close to the door and could hear
everything that was said loudly. According to her, the extent of communication was minimal in all sessions.
16 The standard deviation of the introductory period is 5 minutes. Differences in length are due to delays
in arrival of participants and differences in the number of questions that were asked during the introduction.
The standard deviation of the duration of working period 1 is 6.6 min. Differences in the lengths of working
period 1 are mainly due to delays in the introductory period.
17 This statement ensures that in control as well as in the treatment sessions, subjects were aware of the
fact that we could link data entered into the database to the login codes provided.
18 The mean of working period 2 is 54.2 min with a standard deviation of 4.1 min. We account for
differences in the length of working periods in the statistical analysis by using productivity per minute of
working time as the dependent variable. Additionally, we control for the length of working period 1 in the
regressions.
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3.3 Treatments
As described above, the treatment interventions took place after working period 1. The
different scripts can be found in Appendix B. In all treatments, including the control
treatment, the research assistant informed subjects that the data were transmitted correctly
from all computers to the central server. Nothing else happened in the Control treatment,
so that we can measure the development of productivity without recognition but with
disruption. In treatments involving thank-you cards, she continued by saying that the
research team, together with the president of the institute, had created thank-you cards as a
symbol of the institute’s gratitude and appreciation of the participants’ support in entering
the data. To ensure that the card would be considered as a clear signal of appreciation, all
cards were personally signed by the head of the institute, president Professor Franz, see
Figure 1.
We implemented the following treatments. In the treatment “Thank-you card for all”
(TC All), the research assistant handed a card to each participant. This treatment allows
us to measure the response to general appreciation and recognition. In the treatment
“Thank-you card for the best 3” (TC Best3), subjects were informed that the research
assistant had only three cards available, and had spontaneously decided to hand these out
to those three persons who had performed best until then.19 The treatment “Thank-you
card for the best 1” (TC Best1) was identical to TC Best3 apart from the fact that there
was only one recipient of a thank-you card, the participant who performed best in the first
working period.
The scarcity of cards was explained by saying that the president did not manage to
sign a card for each participant. This excuse renders it unlikely that participants expect
additional cards at the end of working period 2 and makes sure that subjects knew that
there was a practical reason for making recognition scarce. As there were fewer than eight
workers in some sessions, we adjusted the number of cards in accordance to the actual
group size to keep the percentage of subjects who received cards comparable.20
Since sessions took place over the course of several months, we cannot rule out that
participants in later sessions heard about treatments in earlier sessions. We took two
measures to address this concern. First, we conducted the more salient treatments (TC
19 We measured performance in terms of the number of finished questionnaires in working period 1.
Subjects were told that the IT department had informed the research assistant which three logins had
performed best. Hence, in all treatments, including the control, subjects knew that the research assistant
herself could not directly observe the performance of subjects in real-time. She announced that login codes
X, Y, and Z performed best and called the names of the participants who were assigned these logins.
20 For a group size of 7-8 persons we assigned three thank-you cards, and for a group size of 5-6 persons
we assigned two thank-you cards in treatment TC Best3. We control for group size in all regressions. The
results are not sensitive to this.
11
Best3, TC Best1) subsequent to the less salient treatments (Control, TC All). Second,
we elicited how people learned about the job in the feedback form at the end of the
employment. Only a handful of subjects indicated that they had learned about the job
from a friend. The exclusion of these subjects from the analysis does not change the
results.
4 Results
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics by treatment. The sample from the described
treatments contains 340 observations, 81 in Control, 82 in TC All, 95 in TC Best3, and 82
in TC Best1.21 There are statistically significant differences between treatments in some
of the observables. However, as shown below, controlling for these characteristics does
not alter the results. Treatments are balanced with respect to baseline performance, i.e.,
performance in the first working period. Throughout the paper, performance is measured
as the number of correct entries per minute of working time.22
We first examine the main treatment effects. Figure 2 gives a first impression. It
shows the average improvement in performance between working periods 1 and 2 for the
different treatments. Individuals in the Control treatment show almost no improvement in
performance. By contrast, individuals in treatments with recognition clearly improve their
performance. This effect is most pronounced in TC Best3. Also, performance improves
slightly more in TC Best1 as compared to TC All suggesting that recognition motivates
and that exclusive recognition works better than praising everyone.
This picture is confirmed by a regression analysis. We estimate the following baseline
equation:
yi,t=2 = α + β1TCAll + β2TCBest3 + β3TCBest1
+δ1yi,t=1 + δ2y
2
i,t=1 + δ3y
3
i,t=1 +
8∑
j=2
γjri,j + εi,s, (1)
21 In total, 363 persons participated in 48 sessions. We dropped four sessions (two of Control and two
of TC All) from the analysis due to severe server breakdowns during working time. Moreover, we excluded
two participants as they were hardly able to work on the task due to physical restrictions (one person was
visually impaired and could not read the screen, the other person was over 60 years old and did not know
how to operate the computer mouse).
22 One entry corresponds to checking a box of a multiple choice question on the computer screen or typing
one word in a free-text field of the data entry surface. Correctness of an individual entry is determined by
whether or not it corresponds to what the majority of participants transferred as answer for this particular
question. This serves as a very reliable quality measure because each survey was entered on average 21.6
times (s.d.=10.8).
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where yi,t represents the performance of individual i in working period t. We correct for
initial performance differences between individuals by including performance in the first
period, linearly as well as squared and cubic.23 Additionally, all regressions control for
rank-specific effects that are independent of the treatment where ri,j is a dummy variable
taking value one if the individual i was of rank j in working period 1, and taking value
zero otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by session.
The first column of Table 3 shows the results of estimating (1), the second column
includes gender, field of study, home university, location, time of day, group size, and
length of working period 1 as additional controls. The results of both specifications are
similar. As already suggested by Figure 2, scarce rewards (TC Best3 and TC Best1) have
a positive and significant effect on performance. TC Best3 increases performance by 1.2
clicks per minute, which corresponds to a performance increase of 7.2% or a change
of 0.28 standard deviations. The increase in performance in TC Best1 is smaller than
in TC Best3, although the difference is not statistically significant (Wald-test: p=0.19,
one-sided). Giving recognition to all participants (TC All) also increases performance.
The effect is only weakly statistically significant and smaller than when recognition is
scarce.24 Overall, these results clearly show that performance responds positively to the
provision of recognition, suggesting that recognition might be a cost-effective tool to
stimulate workers’ effort.
In order to shed light on underlying mechanisms and to assess the relevance of the
different theories discussed in Section 2, we next look at recipients and non-recipients of
recognition separately. Recall that the theories have quite distinct predictions regarding
the responses of recipients and non-recipients (see Table 1). Figure 3 gives a first
impression. The figure shows performance improvements separately for recipients and
non-recipients. Recipients increase their performance and this performance increase is
slightly decreasing in the scarcity of the recognition. Standard errors are very high for
recipients in TC Best1 due to the small number of observations in this cell. Interestingly, in
all treatments where the research assistant was forced to differentiate between employees,
the non-recipients subsequently improve by more than the recipients do. The difference is
most pronounced for the TC Best3 treatment, where the improvement of non-recipients is
more than twice as large as the improvement of recipients. Hence, the differences between
the overall treatment effects that we saw above are mainly driven by the non-recipients
rather than the recipients.
23This amounts to a standard diff-in-diff estimation when the coefficient for the linear term is one and
the coefficients of the quadratic and cubic terms are zero. Our specification is more flexible and allows us
to control for mean reversion, for which we find some indication in our data. However, treatment effects
estimated with the more simple diff-in-diff are very close to the ones shown below. See Table 4.
24 The difference between TC All and TC Best3 is not statistically significant (Wald-test: p=0.22,
one-sided).
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An obvious point of criticism on these simple comparisons between recipients and
non-recipients is that there is some randomness in employee performance; and thus we
would expect reversion to the mean in the second working period even in the absence
of any treatment. To account for this, we control for baseline performance (linear,
squared, and cubic) and baseline rank in all our regressions, so that we compare ‘like
with like’.25 Columns III and IV of Table 3 report the results from estimating equation
(1) with separate dummy variables for recipients and non-recipients in each treatment.
The results confirm the descriptive analysis in Figure 3: positive treatment effects are
largely driven by non-recipients. The latter increase their performance by 1.59 clicks per
minute26 in TC Best3 and by about 1.05 clicks per minute in TC Best1, which are both
statistically significantly different from the change in performance of respective others
in the control treatment. By contrast, recipients do not show a statistically significant
increase in performance in TC Best3, and even a slight decrease in performance in TC
Best1.27 The difference between recipients and non-recipients is significant at the 5%
level in TC Best3 (Wald test: p=0.016, one-sided), and at the 10% level in TC Best1
(Wald test: p=0.057, one-sided).28
We have seen that recognition has a strong positive impact on subsequent
performance, in particular when recognition is scarce, but not too scarce. This effect
is primarily caused by the improvement in performance of those who did not receive
recognition. How can we reconcile these findings with the theories discussed in Section 2?
Our results seem most consistent with individuals having a preference for conformity and
being reciprocal at the same time. The strong performance improvement of non-recipients
25 The estimated coefficients for baseline performance point to the presence of mean reversion, albeit
small in magnitude. Additionally, the rank coefficients reveal that all ranks between 2-8 have a negative
relation with performance in the second working period as compared to the base category of the first
rank, and coefficients vary between -0.2 and -0.6. Most other control variables do not have a statistically
significant effect apart from the university where participants study. Students from Mannheim and
Ludwigshafen show a slightly better performance as compared to students from Heidelberg. Our results
are robust to the inclusion of additional controls for different time effects, such as the day of the week or
whether the session took place during final exam period, during the semester, or during semester break. The
results remain qualitatively similar and, depending on the specification, the coefficients of interest even get
slightly larger. Lastly, we ran specifications including interaction terms of treatments with gender and find
no evidence for gender-specific treatment effects.
26 This corresponds to a performance increase of 11.2 percent or a change of 0.46 standard deviations.
27 We can rule out that recipients do not respond because they are at their maximum level of performance
(‘ceiling effects’). Bradler and Neckermann (2013) use the same setup and show that recipients (best
3 performers in the first working period) do increase their performance significantly and substantially
subsequent to receiving a combination of recognition and money.
28The data allow us to analyze treatment effects separately for quantity and quality, where quality is
measured as the error rate (percentage of incorrect entries). The results are reported in Table 5. We find
no significant treatment effects for quality levels except for a smaller error rate in TC All (significant at the
10 percent level). One reason for small effects on the error rate is that quality levels are already at a very
high level in working period 1 (only 1.5% of all entries were incorrect, s.d. = 2.4), leaving little room for
improvement.
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is well in line with conformity theory.29 Moreover, the fact that the improvement in
productivity of non-recipients is larger in TC Best3 than in TC Best1 nicely fits with
the predictions of conformity preferences (Wald test: p=0.06, one-sided). At the same
time, however, conformity theory cannot explain the increase in performance in TC All.
Further, in isolation, conformity theory would predict that recipients of scarce recognition
reduce their performance, while we find small increases in TC Best3. Hence, it seems
likely that employee behavior is also partly driven by reciprocity, which explains these
level-effects. This reciprocity may either stem from an inclination to return a gift (as
discussed in subsection 2.1) or from signaling (as discussed in subsection 2.2). The data
do not allow us to distinguish between these two forms of reciprocity in a meaningful
way.
5 Conclusion
In a controlled workplace context, we have shown that provision of public recognition
to employees causes a statistically and economically significant increase in performance.
Further, we have shown that recognition works best when it is provided exclusively, but
not too exclusively. In groups of eight workers, recognition to the best three performers
in a group led to a stronger performance increase than either recognition to all employees
and recognition to the best performer. The performance increases in response to exclusive
recognition are mainly driven by strong positive responses of non-recipients. Conformity
preferences are the most likely reason for these responses. Upon learning that one does
not belong to the best three performers in a group of eight, non-recipients feel inclined
to improve performance so as to adhere to the apparent group norm. In line with this
interpretation, we find weaker (but still positive) responses of non-recipients when only
the best performer in a group received recognition as this is a weaker signal of low relative
performance than belonging to the bottom five out of eight workers. However, conformity
preferences cannot explain all of our results. In particular, recipients of recognition do not
always decrease performance, as conformity would suggest, but sometimes (slightly and
insignificantly) increase it. Moreover, we find that recognition for all workers in a group
increases performance. A natural candidate to reconcile these findings is that, in addition
to conformity preferences, workers are also reciprocal and hence increase performance in
29 Recall that in the treatments with scarce recognition the research assistant told the employees that she
did not have any further thank-you cards to distribute, rendering it unlikely that the performance increase of
the non-recipients that we observe here is caused by non-recipients’ expectation of and striving for another
round of cards at the end of working period 2. A further reason to be sceptical about this alternative
explanation is that Bradler et al. (2013) do not find any evidence for incentive effects of announced
thank-you cards to the three best performing workers in an identical setup.
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response to recognition.
Our findings have clear management implications. On the one hand, the results
suggest that recognition can be a cost-effective tool for increasing average effort,
especially when recognition is limited to a substantial subset of high performers. On the
other hand, managers need to take into account that the distribution of scarce recognition
provides information to workers about the work norm prevalent in the group. Depending
on the circumstances, this may or may not be beneficial for the company.
The current experiment raises a number of questions that remain open for future
research. Since the performance increase was primarily driven by non-recipients, a
similar effect might be reached at lower cost with pure relative performance information.30
Another potentially very interesting follow-up study could look at whether the effects
persist over time and when recognition is provided repeatedly. Moreover, it might be
fruitful to replicate the design with experienced workers and in a setting where other
incentives are present. Further, in our experiment we explained the lack of thank-you
cards for everyone by stating that time constraints of the president prohibited providing
cards to all. It would be interesting to see whether behavioral patterns change when it is
stated that cards were deliberately made scarce. This may have important implications for
the signaling value of the cards with respect to employer characteristics. These additions
will also be helpful for managers who wonder to what extent the expression of one’s
gratefulness can be used strategically and repeatedly.
30 Neckermann and Yang (2012) report the results of a lab experiment with a similar setup. In the
experiment, five agents work for one principal on a real-effort task. The profit of the principal depends on
the effort of the agents. In one treatment, participants learned about the identities of the top three performers
in the group (pure information). In two other treatments, the principal could opt for a message of recognition
or a financial bonus to the top three performers. They show that non-recipients increase their effort similarly
in all treatments. This suggests that the information per se rather than the rewards drives the response of
non-recipients. Interestingly, the authors do not find any performance response from the recipients in all of
their treatments, either.
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Appendix A: Signaling in Equilibrium
In this section, we formally characterize the threshold level of altruism α∗ and show under
what conditions an interior solution exists. The threshold level of altruism α∗ is defined
as the employer type who is indifferent between creating and not creating cards:
c (α∗) =
∑
i=1
e∗i
(
1 + α∗
2
)
−
∑
i=1
e∗i
(
α∗
2
)
+
α∗
∑
i=1
E
(
ui | α̂ = 1 + α
∗
2
)
− α∗
∑
i=1
E
(
ui | α̂ = α
∗
2
)
,
where e∗i (α̂) is a worker’s equilibrium effort when his expected value of the employer’s
altruism equals α̂. By inserting e∗i = β + γα̂j into the worker’s utility function, his
equilibrium utility can be written as
ui = wi +
1
2
(β + γα̂j)
2 + γα̂j (n− 1) [(β + γα̂j)− wi],
where n is the total number of workers employed by the employer. Note that workers
rationally expect that coworkers hold the same beliefs as themselves (this is not crucial
for the results). Existence of an interior solution is ensured if c(0) > 1
2
γn (so that selfish
employers do not wish to create cards) and, following the condition above, that c(1) is not
too high (so that the most altruistic type finds it worthwhile to create cards). Note that the
marginal costs of signaling are decreasing in α∗, while the marginal benefits are increasing
in α∗. The latter is true for two reasons. First, more altruistic employers put more weight
on the increase in workers’ utility when workers’ expectations about the employer’s type
become more favorable. Second, workers’ equilibrium utility is quadratic in α∗.
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Appendix B: Treatment Scripts
Control:
"May I bother you for a moment? I just talked to our IT-specialists. They did a brief
check on our server. The data have been correctly transmitted from all computers so far.
We were previously struggling with some software problems but now everything seems
to work fine."
Thank-you card for all (TC All):
"May I bother you for a moment? I just talked to our IT-specialists. They did a brief
check on our server. The data have been correctly transmitted from all computers so far.
We were previously struggling with some software problems but now everything seems
to work fine. We would also like to take the opportunity to thank you in advance for
your help. In preparation for this data-entry job, our president, Wolfgang Franz, and we
have decided to give everyone this thank-you card as a symbol of our appreciation and
thankfulness for your support. [While assigning the cards:] Thank you very much for
your commitment!"
Thank-you card for best 3 (TC Best3):
"May I bother you for a moment? I just talked to our IT-specialists. They did a brief
check on our server. The data have been correctly transmitted from all computers so
far. We were previously struggling with some software problems but now everything
seems to work fine. We would also like to take the opportunity to thank you in advance
for your help. In preparation for this data-entry job, our president, Wolfgang Franz, and
we have decided to give everyone this thank-you card as a symbol of our appreciation
and thankfulness for your support. However, Prof. Franz was only able to sign a small
number of cards personally. Therefore, we have decided just now to hand these cards to
those of you who entered most data so far. Our IT-specialists have told us that logins
A, B, and C have transmitted most data so far. This should be Mr. /Mrs. X, Y, and Z,
correct? [While assigning the cards:] A special thank to you, Mr./Ms. X, Y, and Z for
your commitment."
Thank-you card for best 1 (TC Best1):
"May I bother you for a moment? I just talked to our IT-specialists. They did a brief
check on our server. The data have been correctly transmitted from all computers so
far. We were previously struggling with some software problems but now everything
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seems to work fine. We would also like to take the opportunity to thank you in advance
for your help. In preparation for this data-entry job, our president, Wolfgang Franz, and
we have decided to give everyone this thank-you card as a symbol of our appreciation
and thankfulness for your support. However, Prof. Franz was only able to sign a small
number of cards personally. Therefore, we have decided just now to hand the card to
that person who entered most data so far. Our IT-specialists have told us that login A has
transmitted most data so far. This should be Mr./Mrs. X, correct? [While handing over
the card:] A special thank to you, Mr./Ms. X for your commitment."
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Figures and Tables
5.1 Figures
Figure 1: Thank-you Card
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Figure 2: Improvement in correct entries per minute by treatment (+/- standard error)
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Figure 3: Improvement in correct entries per minute by treatment and performance
group (+/- standard error)
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5.2 Tables
Table 1: Theoretical Predictions
Card for all Card for best 3 Card for best 1
Reciprocity R: + < R: + < R: +
N: 0 N: 0
Conditional + > + > +
altruism
Conformity R: 0 R: − > R: −
N: + > N: +
Note: R denotes recipients of recognition, N denotes non-recipients.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Treatment
Control TC All TC Best 3 TC Best 1
N 81 82 95 82
Female 0.593 0.549 0.558 0.659
(0.494) (0.501) (0.499) (0.477)
Economics major 0.383 0.317 0.368 0.512*
(0.489) (0.468) (0.485) (0.503)
Mannheim 0.556 0.427 0.779*** 0.744**
(0.500) (0.498) (0.417) (0.439)
Morning 0.407 0.317 0.389 0.268*
(0.494) (0.468) (0.490) (0.446)
Afternoon 0.235 0.402** 0.274 0.451***
(0.426) (0.493) (0.448) (0.501)
Evening 0.358 0.280 0.337 0.280
(0.482) (0.452) (0.475) (0.452)
Group size 6.852 7.024 7.421*** 7.512***
(0.760) (0.994) (0.833) (0.633)
Duration of working period 1 96.585 102.693*** 105.426*** 102.248***
(6.237) (7.516) (4.127) (5.100)
Mannheim university 0.259 0.305 0.411** 0.451**
(0.441) (0.463) (0.495) (0.501)
Ludwigshafen university 0.210 0.134 0.232 0.146
(0.410) (0.343) (0.424) (0.356)
Heidelberg university 0.506 0.549 0.305*** 0.390
(0.503) (0.501) (0.463) (0.491)
Baseline performance1 15.873 16.628 16.191 16.528
(3.066) (3.754) (4.193) (3.745)
Note: The table reports means for each group. Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses.
Significance levels indicate a difference of means (compared to the control group) and are denoted
as follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1 Baseline performance is measured as correct entries per minute in working period 1.
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Table 3: Treatment Effects on Productivity in Working Period 2
I II III IV
TC All 0.839* 0.818* 0.845* 0.828*
(0.439) (0.433) (0.440) (0.434)
TC Best3 1.272*** 1.163***
(0.386) (0.408)
TC Best1 0.941** 0.882**
(0.385) (0.386)
TC Best3 - Rec. 0.647 0.515
(0.518) (0.535)
TC Best3 - Non-Rec. 1.698*** 1.588***
(0.407) (0.430)
TC Best1 - Rec. 0.043 -0.046
(0.761) (0.757)
TC Best1 - Non-rec. 1.100*** 1.046***
(0.377) (0.382)
Controls
Baseline performance Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes
Observations 627 627 627 627
Sessions 91 91 91 91
R2 0.781 0.784 0.783 0.787
Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors clustered by session are reported in parentheses). The dependent
variable is a worker’s performance in the second working period measured by the number of correct database entries per minute. TC
All represents the treatment where all subjects in a work group received a thank-you card after the first working period. TC Best3 and
TC Best1 refer to sessions where thank-you cards were assigned to either the best three or the best performing subjects, respectively.
Treatment Control is omitted and serves as the reference category. All columns include controls for baseline performance, its squared
and cubic term, as well as the performance rank of participants in working period 1. Column II includes additional controls for
demographics such as gender, university and field of study as well as other controls such as location, time of day, duration of working
period 1 and group size. Column III allows for differential treatment effects for recipients (Rec.) and non-recipients (Non-Rec.)
of thank-you cards. Column IV additionally includes all control variables. Note that all regressions also include dummies for and
observations from four other treatments, which are reported in Bradler and Neckermann (2013) and Bradler et al. (2013). The data are
included to obtain more accurate estimates of the coefficients for the control variables. Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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5.3 Supplementary Tables – not for publication
Table 4: Simple Diff-in-Diff Estimation of Treatment Effects on the Difference in Productivity between
Working Periods 2 and 1
I II III IV
TC All 0.820* 0.804* 0.820* 0.802*
(0.474) (0.462) (0.475) (0.463)
TC Best3 1.315*** 1.277***
(0.385) (0.411)
TC Best1 0.925** 0.915**
(0.368) (0.372)
TC Best3 - Rec. 0.626 0.557
(0.512) (0.524)
TC Best3 - Non-Rec. 1.755*** 1.730***
(0.410) (0.446)
TC Best1 - Rec. 0.431 0.399
(0.710) (0.700)
TC Best1 - Non-rec. 1.001*** 1.001***
(0.359) (0.368)
Controls
Demographics Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes
Observations 627 627 627 627
Sessions 91 91 91 91
R2 0.082 0.092 0.096 0.108
Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors clustered by session are reported in parentheses). The dependent
variable is the difference in correct entries per minute between working period 2 and working period 1. TC All represents the treatment
where all subjects in a work group received a thank-you card after the first working period. TC Best3 and TC Best1 refer to sessions
where thank-you cards were assigned to either the best three or the best performing subjects, respectively. Treatment Control is
omitted and serves as the reference category. Column I and II shows overall treatments effects. Column III and IV allows for
differential treatment effects for recipients (Rec.) and non-recipients (Non-Rec.) of thank-you cards. Columns II and IV include
addtional controls for demographics such as gender, university and field of study as well as other controls such as location, time of
day, duration of working period 1 and group size. Note that all regressions also include dummies for and observations from four other
treatments, which are reported in Bradler and Neckermann (2013) and Bradler et al. (2013). The data are included to obtain more
accurate estimates for the coefficients for the control variables. Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Treatment Effects on Total Productivity and Error Rates in Working Period 2
Total Productivity Error Rate
I II III IV
TC All 0.688 0.697 -0.589** -0.592**
(0.432) (0.432) (0.262) (0.264)
TC Best3 1.167*** 0.140
(0.427) (0.258)
TC Best1 0.846** -0.188
(0.402) (0.204)
TC Best3 - Rec. 0.425 -0.136
(0.550) (0.275)
TC Best3 - Non-Rec. 1.661*** 0.305
(0.446) (0.318)
TC Best1 - Rec. -0.109 -0.304
(0.780) (0.235)
TC Best1 - Non-rec. 1.021** -0.169
(0.396) (0.219)
Controls
Baseline performance Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 627 627 627 627
Sessions 91 91 91 91
R2 0.780 0.783 0.623 0.624
Note: This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (standard errors clustered by session are reported in parentheses). The dependent
variable is a worker’s performance in the second working period measured by the number of correct database entries per minute. TC
All represents the treatment where all subjects in a work group received a thank-you card after the first working period. TC Best3 and
TC Best1 refer to sessions where thank-you cards were assigned to either the best three or the best performing subjects, respectively.
Treatment Control is omitted and serves as the reference category. In columns I and II, the dependent variable is a worker’s total
number of entries made in the second working period. In columns III and IV, the dependent variable is a worker’s error rate in the
second working period. The error rate is calculated by dividing total errors by total entries entered. All columns include controls
for baseline performance, its squared and cubic term, as well as the performance rank of participants in working period 1. Baseline
performance is measured as the number of entries in working period 1 in columns I and II, and the error rate in working period 1
in columns III and IV, respectively. Further, all regressions include controls for demographics such as gender, university and field of
study as well as other controls such as location, time of day, duration of working period 1 and group size. Column II and IV allow
for differential treatment effects for recipients (Rec.) and non-recipients (Non-Rec.) of thank-you cards. Note that all regressions also
include dummies for and observations from four other treatments, which are reported in Bradler and Neckermann (2013) and Bradler
et al. (2013). The data are included to obtain more accurate estimates for the coefficients for the control variables. Significance levels
are denoted as follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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